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LEGISLATION
New York Motion Picture

Censorship Law
Authority for the censorship of motion pictures in New York State is found in Section
122 of the Education Law which provides
that a license shall be issued after inspection
of a film unless it or any part of it ". . . is
obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its
exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or
incite to crime. . . ." No motion picture (other
than scientific, educational or current events
films) may be exhibited in any place of
amusement for pay or in connection with any
business in the State of New York unless it
has been licensed.
Recently, within a comparatively short period, the Supreme Court of the United States
has reviewed two provisions of the New York
censorship statute and found them to be unconstitutional. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), the Board of
Regents refused to issue a license on the
ground that the picture was "sacrilegious."
The Supreme Court reversed an earlier decision [Mutual Film Corporationv. Industrial
Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915)]
and held that expression by means of motion
pictures was included within the free speech
and free press guarantee of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments and that the standard under attack was so vague and indefinite
as to offend the Due Process Clause. In Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York, 346 U.S.
587 (1954), the provision for withholding a
license from a film on the grounds that it was
"immoral" and "tended to corrupt morals"
was held unconstitutional. In a brief memorandum decision in which the Burstyn case
was cited, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the New York Court of Appeals
which had held the provision constitutional.
Ordinarily, the Supreme Court is bound by

the determination of the highest court of the
state in the latter's construction of the statute
or any of its terms. [See Hebert v. Louisiana,
272 U.S. 312, 317 (1926)]. However, in the
Commercial Pictures case, although there was
a 4-2 decision in the Court of Appeals of New
York upholding the constitutionality of the
statute, the four members of the majority were
unable to concur in the meaning of the term
"immoral." Two judges regarded the statute
as referring to "sexual immorality"; one
judge construed it as meaning "contra bonos
mores"; and the fourth held that the term
comprised both elements. Consequently, it is
not surprising that the Supreme Court could
be persuaded that the term was vague and
without definite content.
In both cases, appellants' primary argument was that all censorship of movies was,
per se, unconstitutional. The Supreme Court,
however, did not so hold. Indeed, Justice
Clark, speaking in the Burstyn case for a
unanimous Court, stated [at page 502] that
"It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all
places."
With the exception of Justice Douglas, who
has consistently voiced the opinion that censorship is unconstitutional per se, [see concurring opinions in Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S.
960 (1952), and Commercial PicturesCorp.
v. Regents of the University of the State of
New York, supra] and with the possible exception of Justice Black, who joined with Justice Douglas in the concurring opinion of the
last cited case, the members of the Supreme
Court have not committed themselves to a
position adverse to a proper form of censorship. Indeed, their recorded utterances would
seem to align them in favor of a properly
drawn censorship statute. [See Arguments
Before the Court, 22 U.S. Law Week 3181
(1954), 20 U.S. Law Week 3281 (1952)].
Justice Reed, assuming the validity of a licens-

ing system in the Burstyn case, concurred with
the majority on the ground that that particular film was not one which the First Amendment would permit a state to exclude from
public view [at page 506]. Justice Frankfurter, with whom Justices Jackson and Burton joined, concurred with the majority in the
Burstyn case in an opinion devoted entirely
to the contention that the word "sacrilegious"
was so vague as to offend the Due Process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment [at
pp. 507-533]. Similarly, in his concurring
opinion in the Gelling case, Justice Frankfurter agreed with the decision of the majority
but again limited his remarks to the question
of indefiniteness of the statutory standard.
It appears, therefore, that the Supreme
Court would uphold the validity of a system
of prior restraints if the provisions of the
statute were so clear, precise, and unambiguous as to satisfy the requirements of definiteness under the Due Process Clause. [See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948)]. In
this connection, it should be noted that the
Supreme Court of Illinois, in a decision subsequent to the Commercial Pictures and Superior Films cases, upheld the right of the
City of Chicago to ban a film on the ground
that it is obscene, rejecting the contention
that the Burstyn, Gelling, Commercial Pictures Corp. or Superior Films, Inc. cases required a different result. The film which the
Chicago censor banned on the ground of obscenity, "The Miracle," was the same film
which New York unsuccessfully attempted to
ban on the ground that it was sacrilegious.
[See American Civil Liberties Union v. City
of Chicago, 121 N.E. 2d 585 (Ill. 1954)].
In view of these two successful attacks on
the constitutionality of the provisions of the
New York motion picture censorship law,
the New York Legislature by Chapter 620 of
the Laws of 1954 amended the Education
Law by adding a new Section 122-a which
defines some of the terms used in Section
122. The legislation was precipitated primarily to overcome the decision of the Supreme Court in the CommercialPictures Corporation case, which held that the banning of

the film "La Ronde" on the grounds that it
was immoral was unconstitutional. New Section 122-a which defines "immoral," "of such
a character that its exhibition would tend to
corrupt morals" and "incite to crime" reads as
follows:
§ 122-a. Definitions.
1. For the purpose of section one hundred
twenty-two of this chapter, the term "immoral" and the phrase "of such a character
that its exhibition would tend to corrupt
morals" shall denote a motion picture film or
part thereof, the dominant purpose or effect
of which is erotic or pornographic; or which
portrays acts of sexual immorality, perversion, or lewdness, or which expressly or impliedly presents such acts as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior.
2. For the purpose of section one hundred
twenty-two of this chapter, the term "incite to
crime" shall denote a motion picture the dominant purpose or effect of which is to suggest
that the commission of criminal acts or contempt for law is profitable, desirable, acceptable, or respectable behavior; or which advocates or teaches the use of, or the methods
of use of, narcotics or habit-forming drugs.
Although the Legislature omitted to define
the term "sacrilegious," it may have been motivated by the difficulty of defining the term
rather than by its concurrence in the unfortunate holding of the Burstyn case that the
term admits of no precise definition. It is also
significant that the Legislature omitted to define the term "obscene" probably on the wellfounded belief that this term has acquired a
common law meaning of sufficient precision
to withstand attacks under the Due Process
Clause and that it had been, inferentially at
least, approved in the Burstyn case.
Although a more comprehensive statute
might have been more desirable, to the extent
that Section 122-a does define terms, it is so
clearly drawn that both the motion picture industry and the censoring agency have an objective standard by which they may be guided
and it would appear that the constitutional
requirement of definiteness has been met.

